television for serious readers. a look at reconstruction with afghanistan. in and future postwar rebuilding efforts. .. .. >> my name is john allan, president of rookies. it is my distinct pleasure today to be joined by my friend john,

special or general for guinness to reconstruction. john joins us as part or event today entitled afghanistan lessons from the u.s. experience experience -- stabilization, lessons from the u.s. experience of afghanistan. this event happens to share the same title but the report issued by cigr rolled out today and you'll be hearing from john shirley on the report's contents, findings and recommendations. i've had the honor of knowing this gentleman, john socko for many years and he was a vital partner to me in my previous role leading u.s. naval forces in afghanistan and a trusted advisor to many u.s. policymakers then leaders throughout the year. they maintain close and tireless oversight of our mission in

afghanistan and have been a critical part of ensuring we remain accountable for our effort and equally important, making sure we learn from our successes as well as our mistakes. frankly, over the last nearly 17 years of the conflict there has been much to learn. so the audience for this hour, john will first provide us his own set of remarks laying out the report. then we will come together on the stage for roughly 30 minutes of conversation, which will be assured. q&a between him and me. we will have enough time in that hour to go out to the audience for a couple questions. we will be followed by a panel that will have a discussion on the report in afghanistan writ large, which given the caliber of the panelists we have today, will undoubtedly be an excellent discussion and not without some pointed views and it will be during that period of time we will have dirty minutes probably

for audience questions and answers. finally, i would be remiss in not noting that this event takes place just a few days before our most solemn and important of american holidays, memorial day. mall over 2000 u.s. servicemen and women have made the ultimate sacrifice in afghanistan since 2001, is often overlooked and sometimes forgotten our sacrifices by many foreign service officers from the u.s.a. i.t. professionals and civilians of all stripes and forms as well as their numerous coalition partners and allies who also gave their lives in the name of peace and security for the people of afghanistan. memorial day is about honoring each of these heroes and we must never forget them in their sacrifices. the lives lost must mean

something. in due to the lessons learned from reports of organizations like sigar, we can and must find a new and better way to ensure that our missions are achieved with greater effect and with less sacrifice, less suffering in less waste for all parties. with that, let me welcome john sopko, special inspector general for afghanistan to the stage for his keynote remarks. john. >> good morning. general comment thank you for those very kind remarks in that introduction. more importantly, for hosting today's event and the relief of our fourth lessons learned report, which is entitled to

stabilization, lessons from the u.s. experience in afghanistan. this report is the culmination of two years of work by our office and examines the u.s. stabilization efforts in afghanistan committee detailing how usaid, state department and defense department tried to support and legitimize the afghan government in contested districts in afghanistan from 2002 until 2017. today's report is also available in any directive format. like all of our products, and may be downloaded from our website at www..sigar .mil. i think we are the only inspector general's office to release his records in such a format. sigar will be releasing its fifth lessons learned report on june 14th, focusing on our

counternarcotics effort in afghanistan for those who are interested. we began our lessons learned program in late 2014 and a suggestion you, general allen and also ryan crocker and some others. my staff has told me that i have credited you enough time about her lessons learned program that we should probably start writing some royalty checks. [laughter] that would be wrong. [laughter] in all seriousness, you made an observation that resonated with me during one of my first trips to afghanistan while you are the commanding general and we later followed up on not after you retired at a little breakfast meeting over in pentagon city. even noted that of all the worthwhile audits and investigations that sigar was

the income that there is still a question left unanswered. what's it all mean? and what did all mean in the larger context of reconstruction and national security? part of the reason you and others thought the lessons learned program would be a worthwhile endeavor for my organization to undertake is due to our unique jurisdiction. of all the iag we have jurisdiction to look at all u.s. programs and projects in afghanistan regardless of their funding source and which agency is actually cannot think those programs. we are statutorily unique in that fashion since we are the only federal oversight agency that can look holistic late at the wolf government effort in afghanistan, which means we are not constrained by agency

stovepipes. i am pleased to say that there has been great interest in her lessons learned reports out today to in today's report is really no different. while we were finalizing the report, the department of state and defense, along with usaid were finalizing their own stabilization assistance review or sar andreas sigar on their work. it was recently approved and is well aligned with the sigar report we are releasing today. but before i go any further, i think we have to ask the question, what is stabilization? it is one of those terms that is rarely if ever precisely defined. but definitions have buried the u.s. agency and even within a particular agency over the last

17 years within afghanistan, earlier this year the u.s. government finally defined stabilization as a political endeavor involving a civilian military process to create conditions where locally legitimate can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. put simply, stabilization is the process of building sufficient government to keep insurgents from returning in convincing the population of that area to the government role is preferable to insurgent role. the stabilization in dan was not the first the u.s. government has undertaken, nor will it be the last.

given the dangers of allowing poorly governed spaces to serve as launching pads for transnational terrorist groups, we anticipate future u.s. government to stabilize the theory is that clearing terrorist groups and helping generate sufficient governments to keep terrorists from returning. not only in afghanistan, but around the globe. i believe the panel discussion this morning will go into greater detail about that. today's report contains seven findings, identifies 10 lessons, make seven recommendations to the executive branch and includes formatters for congressional consideration. rather than go through every one of these, i would like to begin

with our overall assessment of the stabilization effort in afghanistan and then highlight issues of particular concern. unfortunately, sigar's overall assessment despite some heroic efforts to stabilize and secure in contested areas in afghanistan between 2002 and 2017, the program was mostly a failure. this has been for a number of reasons, including the establishment of a set of unrealistic expectations about what we could do and what could be achieved in just a few years time. a lack of capacity to fully support those efforts and institutional rivalries and bureaucratic hurdles compounded this already difficult task.

every organization and agents be we've found that works on stabilization in afghanistan from dod affairs special operation forces suffered from personnel and programming deficits. born for rapid scaling, short tours of duty under pressure to show quick progress. the organization we found was prepared for the challenges and it showed with the results. stabilization is unique because it is an inherently joint civilian military undertaken. yet, given the size and resources that dod they determine priorities on the ground and shows the focus of

the most insecure districts. but ironically one with unintended negative consequences . because those areas remain perpetually insecure and cleared of insurgents again and again. civilian agencies, particularly usaid were compelled to conduct programs in this fiercely contested areas that were not ready for stabilization. because the coalition focused on the most secure areas in security after clearing them. afghans were too afraid to serve at the local government. afghans civilians also have little faith that they are districts would remain in

government hands when the coalition was proved and struggled to execute programs on this the violence. u.s. agencies were unable to adequately monitor and evaluate the projects. we spent a lot of time on that particular issue. one of the challenges in afghanistan as i alluded to in the report today came from the institutional differences and rivalries that started in washington. while the military was focused on clear bill of, those are tenants of the coin doctrines. state and usaid face challenges given pressure from dod to quickly show gains on the ground. this led to significant tensions in the military over inability

to work into milk districts. to reverse taliban momentum. yeah clear that something very different for the military than it did to aid in the afghan contractors tasked with example paving the road and insecure environment. the military may have deemed that area safe enough for them, but it made little difference if the contract nurse charged with executing the hole or build phase is stabilization effort were in danger or felt they were so. some senior aid officials told our staff that coalition military forces push the agency into going along with clear hold

and build and demanded its implemented programs such as cash for work on a large scale over aids objections. senior military officials likewise told us that they had little choice but to do things quickly and focus on the most dangerous areas. you have to remember the timeline, the short timeline the military was given. officials also have a difficult time arguing against the military believed that they would either support of the population convinced to share information about ieds and save coalition lines. as one aide official told us, quote, the military expected us to be bags of cash, unquote. prior to the surge can't aid advisors were often able to

exercise veto power about where and how military commanders used funds, particularly from the commanders emergency response program. but later, usa's influence over expenditures were significantly diminished as we were doing the draw down and quick exit from dan. as one official noted went aide tried to stop implementing projects in areas where they could not be monitored or evaluated, the military sometimes set aside the partnership model and used funding unilaterally. as a result, all types of stabilization program and were implemented during all stages of the clear sequins, even when the sequencing was inappropriate in the programs would be ineffective. under pressure from the military, places where they cannot be monitored.

the government cannot maintain and students only attended sporadically if at all due to insecurity. military commanders likewise concentrated large projects and less secure areas where they were less likely to succeed. in contrast to dod, state and aid commenced to agencies that provided most for the search did not have sufficient staffing, especially built-in staff redundancy to enable rapid mobilization in the field. without that capacity in afghanistan, state and aid particularly struggled to meet demand for the civilian surge, staff from the other assignment and hire temporary staff. the number of civilian personnel under embassy kabul's control, for example, more than tripled between january 2009 and

december 2011. astoundingly, by 2011, more than 20% of usaid's worldwide staff were in afghanistan. as one aide official told train to come at the height of the civilian surge, or existing numbers were so limited, we were forced to bring on roughly 250 to 300 d. people per year to do the work of eight across afghanistan. unfortunately, many had no or little crack to go aid experience. one of the higher is told our staff that he got the job because, quote, i had a pulse and a master's degree, unquote. at 2011, the demand for personnel had so exceeded the supply that they were unable to hire enough people to fill

civilian slots that coalition military forces select it even with the hiring of temporary employees. i would like to say one thing. if i could get some water. >> as i said, the use of temporary hires by aid and state actually have both positive and negative trade-offs. on the positive side, unlike permanent aid and state personnel, temporary hires could stay in afghanistan more than one year, avoiding the loss of institutional memory for what i and my staff called the quote, unquote annual lobotomy that occurs when personal rotate out of the country after one year or less. unfortunately, the same

temporary hires had little if any experience or training in monitoring and project oversight in carrying out specific projects. as a result, we were astounded to find out a few of those civilians working at the local level had agency authority to oversee programming. at one point, usaid's regional representatives who are the most senior u.s. made officials assigned to each regional command in afghanistan had no oversight authority over the programs in the area of operations. decisions therefore had to default to the embassy in kabul, which had problems obviously of communicating with late to the staff in the field. contracting also surged. at one point the high ranking aide official determined in order to meet the u.s. government average ratio of dollars to the number of

contracting officials would have to spend nearly its entire overseas workforce to afghanistan. the number of contractor personnel overseen by state and a personnel was extremely large. in 2011, there were approximately 18 contract errors for every direct hire state and the ratio was 100 to one and usaid. now, even with a sufficient number of highly trained personnel, stabilization operations are not in his 10 would have been challenging. unfortunately, as the report lays out a mistake and he did not have the right personnel to execute the mission in spite of years earlier to provide them with exactly that capability. despite all of his and despite

all of those other challenges, the question ultimately we ask is did stabilization in afghanistan work and was it effective? they didn't meet its goal. we talk a lot about input, output and now comes. now, as our report lays out, we try to answer that question by looking at experts who have studied the issue. an external research review by sigar found that the evidence is inconclusive and sometimes contradict every. some research found that usaid and the state department programming actually did accomplish stabilization. some found no impact and other research found the program was destabilizing. some thought or seem to be common among the most successful stabilization interventions in

afghanistan. and those are laid out in a report and actually, we have on the panel a military leader who we highlighted as one of the leaders who actually succeeded in stabilization in his district into dire. what did we find with we find were the common lessons learned, the common best crack says her stabilization to work? first, we found out stabilization with most affect did in areas where the government had a degree of physical control. second, it was also more successful when implementors undertook fewer activities with a higher degree of oversight, flexibility and staffing. third, stabilization could not be done while on the cheek. successful projects were

labor-intensive for donors and implementing partners alike. fourth, we found that last could result in small gains that require constant reinforcement to avoid reversals. the timeline that u.s. agencies were operating under the assumed that quick security gains would be matched by equally quick stabilization and governance gains. the latter sales materialize before security forces withdrew and instability returned to many of the areas were stabilization programs were working. our research also found implementing smaller projects help programs avoid the pitfalls of working in counterinsurgency. avoiding these pitfalls such as predatory officials, correction and insurgent sabotage while

still providing tangible benefits to communities is easier for smaller scale projects. according to a 2010 u.s. embassy assessment, it was also easier to ensure community buy-in and ownership of small scale infrastructure projects than it was for large ones. as sigar has identified previously, research demonstrated future measures of success such as sheer amount of money spent or outputs produced had no correlation via the eventual impact for outcome. as one senior usaid official told us, if you go fast, you actually go slow. if you go slow on purpose, you actually go faster with stabilization, unquote. one area where u.s. effort in to

get it right was then: our province. the panel discussion will go into that in greater detail, but capable individuals in key roles their willingness by individuals to collaborate and they have a presence of u.s. military forces in the area helped to that initiative succeed more than others in the country. so, in conclusion, i'd identified only a few of the major challenges in the effort to stabilize and days. the poor result of this particular mission may make attempting to some policymakers to conclude stabilization should never be undertaken again. given the security challenges we

face in stabilization or whatever you want to call it is important. eliminating compatibility or capability is not a realistic choice. rather, the u.s. government must address the challenges and capacity constraints identified in the report. given the lack of alternatives to stabilization and then uncover and space that has been cleared of his surgeons are terrorists, the best course of action may be for the u.s. government to balance the importance of any stabilization mission with a realistic understanding of the level of effort required of what is achievable. additionally, our government must approve its ability to prepare for, design, execute, monitor and evaluate stabilization missions. the need for such expertise will not diminish anytime soon.

as military historian max boot writes, quote, while the tools of warfare have changed, the challenges of small wars fought against guerrillas and terrorists have remained constant. american soldiers struggling against al qaeda and the taliban in could profitably study the past to learn how they're against us there's doubt with patient cho cho, philippine insurrection of philippine insurrection is, nicaraguan sandinistas and other irregular foes, unquote. just as with the example that max boot references, we cannot afford to fail to absorb the lessons we've learned in dan as we continue to contemplate such programs both there in afghanistan and other countries in the future.

let me conclude by acknowledging the tireless efforts of those who work on this report. sigar's efforts were led by david young who was supported to jordan came, paul kane, jordan shorter, olivia pac and elizabeth young under the leadership of program direct your. they have my thanks and hopefully you are thanks issuing a report today. with that, thank you for this opportunity to speak. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> i am sure some of you are seeing on your phones that there is an apparent announcement that the white house has just canceled the conversation with the north koreans, so we will see how that develops today. i don't think were going to have a stabilization effort. in the near future. [laughter]

-- he is featured personally with his italian if it's worth taking a look at. i retired from the marine corps in 2013 and i never thought it would be concerned over these matters again are mentioned in a state report. i found myself a special envoy to the coalition and the so-called islamic state. with the onslaught of a says, we had no real idea how this would ultimately take shape, but the one thing we did knows who would have a massive stabilization effort. to keep out -- or isis in the aftermath. it is going to be big across iraq and syria. with that in mind given the

lessons you are already surfacing from the afghan experience, you work to set up a network of inspector general for the very beginning of this which we think is essential to these events, which would look hard to u.s. and coalition effort unfolding to get the most out of the work you are doing. already, you and your team have had an effect on a future crisis we would be involved in. what i would like to do is we'll have a few minutes of questions. i will ask a couple and then we'll go to to the audience for a couple. these are going to be forward-looking. the report speaks for itself. a lot of detail in their about deficiencies in challenges john and his team were able to see and document here this isn't the end for the united state and coalitions already has my remarks implied. the end of the conflict in afghanistan and iraq and syria

and it will continue and we need to profit the work you have done to ensure we are better prepared as we go. again, thinking about the future, john, luscious: a hypothetical administration of the future, we have a crisis. it is one where we have the capacity not as a result of an emergency, but we have the capacity for some deliberate thought about how it will be involved, how it will intervene and how long will it be they are and what the issues will be. you have been summoned to the white house because of your work to advise the president and his national security team on what they should be thinking about right now is the united states contemplates yet another effort

which could result in a large stabilization effort. if i could ask, what would you tell the president? keeping of course in mind that you'll probably be hired. what would you tell the president? two or three things. >> the first thing, general, you and i chatted about this and the green room before we came. get your staff to learn the lesson report that were out there. i was one of the things you discover to your chagrin when you were leading a team event. you had no blueprint, no lessons learned and you found the usaid report out there which actually help to you. reports have been great and we discovered in afghanistan there is an excellent report done by usaid on the involvement from 1850 until late 70s. we found that report and laid out a lot of the issues we were finding right now, but no one

has ever read it. so the first thing is read what has been out there. the problem is today inc. into teaching, et cetera. the second thing, before you go in, know what you're going into. as the military commander, and you have to know to train and that applies to stabilization also. know how and why the people in that region supported the terrorist groups. what was the issue are the issues they were doing? in afghanistan, we decided to duplicate norway in each one of these districts. we decided to provide schools, highways, et cetera, et cetera. we should have looked at what were the services that the taliban and the terrorists and

insurgents provide, which made the people relatively happy. you don't have to give them everything at the start. do it incrementally. the other thing i would tell the president is despite your inclination to do it quickly, announces success and declared that terry, go home. it's going to take a long time. let's be realistic about this. let's be honest to the american people and the american congress that none of these things can be done quickly and successfully. >> okay, the president is dutifully impressed with this. and then lays the bombshell on you that we always expect these days and that if this is going to be a coalition effort come and not just the united states. please advise the president of the united states on how he or she should be thinking about how a communication efforts come to

stabilization effort might be considered. we have 50 nations engaged in the coalition. >> all 50 nations were sometimes going across purposes to each other. >> how to resolve that? how do we think about that? >> first of all, we have to realize we are dealing with our coalition allies all are sovereign nations. they have their own ways of doing what they're doing. their officials, their generals have to respond to. you're never going to eliminate the fact that every country has their own prerequisite, their own, you know, they probably do ours the same. so knowing that, lets us and the germans cannot go into a certain area, take that into consideration. it's not a fault of the german

parliament or the japanese have a restriction. realize that in, but they plan that utilizes each one of those countries best capabilities. that's the first thing. we have to be humble enough to realize that every other country like ours got political answers they have to come to. the other thing, general, is if you know you're going to have a coalition approach, realize that what's promised isn't always what's delivered. you've probably face that with nato. you recruit the troops come in to nato promised, but it turned out have showed up. how do you then go forward with that hole in your approach? i think that is something to take into consideration. >> okay, you're hired.

you know, one of the things that was an issue associated with the nightstand, which i experienced in iraq and elsewhere and i think you've touched on this. how should we be thinking about the stabilization in the lead the reconstruction because they should lend. one should lead logically to the other and sometimes they can go on concurrently. in order to avoid creating additional burdens to the nation. we did leave quite a bill for the afghans each year for her the infrastructure and buildings, et cetera. how should we be thinking about that? >> just thinking about that is important. i don't think we did think about it that much, particularly on the civilian side. part of it is a problem that comes back here to washington. we tend to think in appropriations cycles. maybe we all think that way.

we can appropriations cycle one year, two year money. we have to show success justified. if we don't spend it, we lose it. that is the problem. i've commented before, it is not that anyone was sent to afghanistan was not as smart and not as brave anon is honorable. we gave them a box of broken tools. we gave them a personal system that was broken, procurement system that was broken. your rotational system you had to face was broken. how you could get the people you wanted and have them stay long enough was broken. we need to look at those issues first. i do agree with you about the afghans and i feel bad when i go over and talk to the afghans and we are putting new condition on afghans, but we realize all of

the coalition are also putting new conditions and are not coordinated. each one of the programs from all the various countries have their own requirements, documents that have to be filled out from the meetings that have to be made. you wonder sometimes what is the afghans be thinking. here comes another guy who's going to help me and another burden of putting on them. i think if we could somehow get the allies to think on a common platform, let's not overwhelmed the afghans is filling up paper. paper reform. the paper reduction act which repass years ago here in the united states we ought to apply to our coalition development. >> i think to your point, the personnel rotation processes of all the agencies and use the term broken. i perhaps use different terms, but they were certainly

challenging. remembering that while units came in for a year at a time and it didn't always come in at the same time, there is overlap in a nonchalant of unit. we often heard that this war was fought, 14, think of his 16 year war, one year at a time. i think many of the rotational issues, have they been better coordinate from the beginning across all of the the and across all of the coalition part or as could have given us an operational perspective and a longevity of perspective which would've been helpful. in my first meeting with hamid cars i is the new commander, he pointed out to me that i was the fourth four-star general commanding afghanistan in four years for him. this creates her own institutional inertia does that make us very difficult. 15 minutes left on the session. i would like to again thank

mr. sopko for answers to my questions in his first remarks. let's got to questions. i ask when you get the microphone, in 30 seconds from getting the microphone, a question in what you're saying. we move quickly if i don't see it. this gentleman right here in the front. >> hi, thank you so much for coming to speak here today. my name is jonathan. >> you're about to do that. introduce yourself and tell us where you're from. go ahead. >> firmware. >> from connecticut. >> good for you. >> i wondered if you can speak about pakistan because i think pakistan has been a key variable with stabilization effort. moving forward with our stabilization approach with

afghanistan, what time of approach should we take with afghanistan? >> and i just quickly answer that and i'll defer here. i look at afghanistan and reconstruction. pakistan is obviously an important player. the new strategy from the administration as a key component on pakistan. i am going to defer to the general because you spend a lot more time dealing with the pakistan issue than i did it i'm not avoiding it. it's just i don't do pakistan. >> i'll just give you 30 seconds. the relationship between the united states and pakistan is not divorced from afghanistan. getting the pakistanis to see that their vested interest over the long-term are best served by stable afghanistan. one that does not in fact benefit from the how connie is or other elements is in their long-term best interests. there was a long time and i

believe peace in afghanistan passed through islamabad and in many respects, the long-term stability of pakistan passes not just through islamabad, but also through couple as well. so getting the pakistanis, afghans and international community. a stable afghanistan, one that has the capacity for governmental stability, security to the population and importantly a viable is important to the long-term stability. gentlemen, yes sir, in the shirt. >> thank you. first i would like to thank you. my name is jack siegel and from nato from 2002 until 2010.

when you began the discussion, you sent stabilization keeping insurgents from returning. in my conversations with general carter, general richard, general nicholson, i got the impression that in places in mike kumar, that they went there. but they were simply part of the society. the object of this stabilization. how we picked out the wrong target? >> is a good question. maybe by saying they always stay, what we are indicating is this problem is an afghan problem and it's not like the people are going to run back to pakistan. but, when the area for district is unstable, those people,

whatever the terrorist group is, have to be taken out of the way. eliminated in fashion. they decide to go underground. they decide to join a reconciliation group and become part of the government. that's another way. you have to provide a service, which in many of these districts they provided. and that is part of the idea of creating a central government that can run afghanistan and have government control over regions so it doesn't become a hotbed further terrorist activities. >> can i just add one thing. we keep referring to pakistan as being a key problem. the problem also as we saw in this report was that the afghan government at times was viewed

very negatively by their local people. to insert a government that people support a government that is not predatory. a government with a bunch of lawless warlords. that is the key thing in one of the things i didn't about, but when we poured so much money into these unstable environment, we contributed to the problem of creating more warlords are powerful people who basically took the law into their own hands. in essence, the government introduced, particularly some of the afghan local police forces, which are nothing other than militias with some uniforms were just as bad as the terrorists that were there before. >> let me add to this. you know, if i were also summoned within i.t. to the

white house, one of the i would tell the president is something we learned not just in afghanistan. we had seen it somewhat in iraq, but we really sought in colombia that some days there is a distinction without a difference between the insurgents and the criminal networks. i don't think we had a full grip of that in, which recall the taliban. you have the drug enterprise, which feels an awful lot of his urgent criminal behavior. and i don't believe were properly organized, frankly to deal with that. it's again the president were to ask me my views on how we get ready to go, my first comment to the president would be you must assume that there will be an

inherent, sometimes inextricable link between criminality, corruption in the insurgency and you got to give the civilian agencies in the military commander capacity to bring to bear law enforcement and drug enforcement capabilities in the right numbers to assist in dealing with the uncertainty. we will fool ourselves into believing we defeated the taliban at a particular area, only to find out we've got welle drug enterprise. we have to be thinking those ways. tumor questions over here and then professor maddox on the. yes, sir. >> my name is jeff spacey. he is to work for master john hurt and i spent a few years now doing global development consulting and my company has similar projects in afghanistan

than anywhere else. i'll be headed back there in just a couple of weeks. my first question has to do with one of the elephants in the room which are the afghans themselves. imagine you gentlemen and a lot of people here might agree with something, and observation along these lines that a lot of afghans were pretty darn good, who are well-traveled, speak a lot of languages, who have great skills. and a lot of them are be corrupt out of the way, and there is a lot of capacity already in there in kabul and other cities in afghanistan to make use of. my first question is would you agree with that. my second has to do with donors, mr. sopko, do you mentioned towards the end of your remarks. i remember meeting some e.u. police folks working on a

long-standing project and they obviously spent most of their time coordinating with the u.s., a much bigger police training program. their observations are very much in ink with yours and may have been there for years. some of the additional complaints they would make were that while they were seized and detect is and essentially sergeants and captains and what have you, the american were hirl over the u.s. didn't have a lot of training. and then of course if we are honest with ourselves, a period of a kind of militarization of our police training and that is something the e.u. is very sensitive to. one last thing about the e.u. >> question, sir. >> s., they set up a project where they actually set up a justice ministry and the adjoining office with every top official they are heading e.u.

advisor. so the question is, given that the e.u. doesn't have a great reputation in this town and even more so since the election, are we also able to learn lessons from some of our allies and friends and even you brought up -- you said it donors were all there and putting on contingencies and things, who coordinates all of that? is it always the u.s. because we fund occasion? >> first-tier questions about the afghans. my personal x. if they are a remarkable people. and while i've met a few that i probably want to detain from time to time, the vast, vast majority of the afghans from the most senior, the most modern to the most traditional were extraordinarily admirable

people. i got great commitment ultimately to them until i take my last breath. with respect to the e.u., when i was commander there, which is getting to be a few years ago, but i can speak pretty knowledgeably about it. i felt that the e.u. is a good partner for us. did good work. in some areas where you remember as i'm sure you are familiar with, we had provincial reconstruction teams that were nationally owned. there were some limitations in john used caveat. there was national caveat associated with stabilization weather sometimes gaps with what the hungarians were doing. the e.u. worked very hard to fill in those gaps in the e.u. remains a credible player. is it the perfect outcome? we can all do better, but the e.u. has been a good partner for us in this regard and we may have a different opinion of him places in washington.

the e.u. will be an important partner in the u.n. will continue to be an important partner. when we look at the post as this campaign, what we will discover is one of the hearers as bad of the heroes of that as a woman by the name of these crimes they and we were able to put together a stabilization fund which came in immediately behind declaring a big tikrit or romani or someplace like that, where we were able to put into funding immediately to achieve the rescue of the population to create the environment where the insurgents could in. the u.n. is a great partner. it has to be the right moment for them. the e.u. is a great partner, played at those strengths and recognize they have caveats as well. as john said, this is a matter of having capacity for strategic planning in this regard to not put it together on the ground. it's too late when you put it together on the ground. you have to live the inefficiencies of that.

>> i agree with the general. the one thing i would add about afghanistan. i viewed them as sort of the canary in the coal mine. as long as the current government is still surrounded by the scale, honest, honorable, well-educated and they are taking a lot of risk supporting the government. i meet with the president almost every time i go there. i see his top advisers. as long as we see them i feel good. i feel optimistic. when they disappear, then we've got some that. we issued a report, prior lessons learned report on security sector assistants security sector assistance where we talk in great detail the whole issue of police training and that was one of the problems we saw were sending too many with the u.s. military, helicopter to do police training.

>> one final point. we are in the room advising the president of the united states, one of the key pieces of advice we must give the individual is the process of stabilization has to leverage the civilization. women of that culture. we have to support their aspect of civil society, their role within the stabilization and those suffered and can capitalize on that in leverage it will accelerate the role of women in society, but also leverage one of the most powerful influences as well. let me go to profess does dovetail the previous question and some of your answers. but that is to take the comment on coalitions a little bit further. how do we actually accomplish

addressing these problems with the coalition? do we do that it made no. does the united states taken on. what do you suggest that we learned in these lessons in where and how do we do that? >> go ahead. i'll jump in right behind you. >> i think in our security sector assistance, lessons learned report that came out, we talk about having coalition. now, that was just in the security sector. we have not in this report are lessons learned report on private sector development, really looked at that issue again. that is something we have a lessons learned report called divided responsibilities.

>> will return to this form and reconstruction efforts in afghanistan in a few moments. we interrupted to go live for the u.s. senate for a brief pro forma session.